Hegel's
Inversion
of Philosophy

The philosophical tradition tends to take nature as the measure of the real: what is objectively knowable is what is mind-independent, and the humanly made — language, law, institutions, art — is demoted to the margins of serious metaphysics. Wolf argues that Hegel's mature project is an inversion of exactly this ordering. In the Science of Logic, and more specifically in the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel works out the metaphysical basis for a philosophy in which the paradigm of knowledge is not the mind's grasp of a given nature, but thought's knowledge of its own products. Geist, not nature, sets the standard.

A Hegel whose core concerns diverge sharply from those of the tradition — a Hegel who puts the human, made world front and center. — Sebastian Rand, Georgia State University

The workshop takes up the book's central claims on several fronts: the status of Hegel's Logic as a replacement of metaphysics rather than another metaphysical theory; the reach and limits of the artifactual paradigm across Hegel's system; and its bearing on contemporary debates in German Idealism and the philosophy of concepts. Each session pairs a brief commentary with an extended, open discussion